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Low-Skilled Workers? Low-Skilled Workers?
Surprising Data from Detroit
by David Autor, University of Chicago, and Susan N. Houseman,
W.E. Upjohn Institute A A question  that  has  long  puzzled  policymakers, “Does  temping 
ultimately help welfare recipients move into good, permanent 
jobs?” has not been an easy one to answer. Fortunately, the unique 
way Detroit set up its welfare-to-work program, Work First, has 
provided researchers with an opportunity to find out. The results 
are surprising.1
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Temping and Low-Skilled 
Workers
Temporary-help firms employ a dispropor-
tionate  share  of  low-skilled  and  minority 
U.S. workers. In 2005, for example, African 
American workers accounted for 23 percent 
of workers in temporary-help employment 
and only 11 percent of workers in direct-
hire employment. Latinos were 21 percent 
of temp workers and 13 percent of direct 
hires. The comparable percentages for high 
school dropouts were 17 percent and 9 per-
cent. In contrast, those with college degrees 
made up only 21 percent of temporary-help 
workers and about 33 percent of workers in 
direct-hire employment.2
The  concentration  of  low-skilled 
workers in temporary-help jobs is especially 
pronounced  among  welfare  recipients. 
Recent  analyses  of  state  administrative 
welfare data reveal that 15 percent to 40 
percent  of  former  welfare  recipients  who 
obtained employment after the 1996 U.S. 
welfare reform took jobs in the temporary-
help  sector. The  numbers  are  particularly 
striking considering that the temporary-help 
industry accounts for less than 3 percent of 
average U.S. daily employment. 
The  concentration  of  low-skilled 
workers  in  the  temporary-help  sector, 
in  conjunction  with  the  rapid  growth  of 
temporary-help  jobs,  which  accounted 
for  10  percent  of  net  U.S.  employment 
creation  in  the  1990s  and  almost  one-
third of job loss between 2000 and 2002, 
has catalyzed a research and policy debate 
about whether temporary jobs foster labor   
market advancement. 
Two Hypotheses 
One hypothesis has been that because tem-
porary-help firms face lower hiring, screen-
ing, and termination costs than do conven-
tional, direct-hire employers, they provide 
work for individuals who otherwise would 
have difficulty finding employment. Thus, 
temporary-help jobs may reduce the time 
workers spend in unproductive, potentially 
discouraging job searches and may facilitate 
rapid entry into employment. Moreover, the 
theory  goes,  temporary  assignments  may 
permit  workers  to  develop  the  skills  and 
contacts that can lead, directly or indirectly, 
to  longer-term  jobs.  After  all,  many  em-
ployers use temporary-help assignments to 
screen workers for direct-hire jobs. Tempo-
rary-help jobs could serve as a springboard. 
Alternatively,  numerous  scholars  and 
practitioners have argued that the unstable 
and primarily low-skilled placements offered 
by  temporary-help  agencies  provide  little 
opportunity or incentive for workers to invest 
in  skills  or  develop  productive  job-search 
networks. In support of that view, several 
studies find that workers in temporary-help 
jobs receive on average lower pay and fewer 
benefits than would be expected in direct-
hire  jobs.  And  although  mobility  out  of 
the temporary-help sector is high, many of 
those leaving enter unemployment or exit 
the labor force.
If  temping  was  merely  what  people 
did  instead  of  collecting  unemployment 
while out of work, these facts would be of 
little concern. But to the degree that spells 
in temporary-help employment crowd out 
productive  direct-hire  job  searching,  they 
may inhibit longer-term labor advancement. 
Under this hypothesis, the short-term gains 
from nearer-term employment in temporary-
help  jobs  may  be  offset  by  employment 
instability and poor earnings growth.
Testing these two hypotheses has been 
an  empirical  challenge. The  key  problem 
in  making  inferences  about  whether 
temping causes one scenario or the other 
is  that  there  are  economically  large,  but 
typically  not  measurable,  differences  in 
skills  and  motivation  between  workers 
taking temporary jobs and workers taking 
direct-hire jobs. In the absence of random 
assignment  of  low-skilled  workers  to  the 
two job types, a statistical comparison of 
labor  force  outcomes  among  low-skilled 
workers may not be a reliable gauge of the 
causal  effects  of  temporary-help  jobs  on 
labor market advancement. 
A Window in Detroit
A unique policy in Detroit provided the op-
portunity for the authors to overcome some 
of the research challenges. Unintentionally, 
but nevertheless effectively, Detroit created 
randomized Work First groups suitable for a 
study. For administrative purposes, welfare 
services  were  divided  into  12  geographic 
districts, each served by two to four inde-
pendent Work First contractors in each pro-
gram year. Individuals applying for benefits 
report  to  welfare  offices  in  their  district, 
which in turn refers those eligible for cash 
assistance to a Work First contractor. To en-
sure an even allocation of participants, each 
welfare office randomly distributes entering 
Work First clients among contractors. 
This  randomization  gives  rise  to 
significant  differences  in  direct-hire  and 
temporary-help  job-taking  rates  among 
identical  Work  First  participants  assigned 
to different contractors. Why? The reason 
is  that  each  Work  First  contractor  has 
unique  job-placement  policies—some 
focus on placing clients in direct-hire jobs 
while others rely more on temp agencies. 
Although welfare participants can and do 
find jobs on their own, job developers at 
each contractor play an influential role in 
the search process. 
The  job  developers’  role  includes 
encouraging  or  discouraging  participants 
from  applying  for  specific  jobs  and 
employers, referring participants directly to 
job sites for specific openings, and arranging 
on-site  visits  by  employers—temporary-
help agencies in particular—that screen and 
recruit participants at the Work First office. 
The jobs that Work First participants take 
depend in part on an individual contractor’s 
employer contacts and, more generally, on 
contractor policies that foster or discourage 
temporary agency employment.  
The  random  assignment  process 
enabled the authors to exploit differences 
in the probability that a welfare recipient 
would take a temporary job, a direct-hire 
job—or no job—to study the effects of Work 
First employment and job type on longer-
term earnings and recidivism. Welfare case 
records  from  the  Michigan  Work  First 
program  were  linked  to  complete  wage 
records from the Michigan Unemployment 
Insurance agency for close to 40,000 Work 
First episodes initiated between 1997 and 
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2003. Using those data, the authors analyzed 
how Work First clients’ random assignment 
to  a  given  contractor  affects,  initially, 
their  employment  placement  (direct-hire, 
temporary  help,  or  no  placement)  and, 
ultimately,  their  earnings,  job  stability, 
and welfare recidivism over the subsequent   
two years. 
Not Moving Up
Moving welfare participants into either tem-
porary jobs or direct-hire jobs boosts their 
short-term earnings. In the calendar quar-
ter following placement, workers placed in 
either type of employment earned $500 to 
$600 more than clients who, because of the 
randomization,  were  not  placed  in  a  job 
(but may have found one on their own). 
For those placed in direct-hire jobs, the 
gains persist. Over two years, the average 
direct-hire placement boosts total earnings 
by approximately $4,500 (55 percent more 
than the earnings of those who receive no 
job  placement)  and  appears  to  increase 
the probability that a participant remains 
in  ongoing  employment  with  a  single 
employer.  The  stability  is  particularly 
valuable to welfare participants, who often 
face challenges coordinating transportation 
and  child  care  to  meet  unstable  work 
schedules.  Perhaps  for  this  reason,  clients 
placed in direct-hire jobs have lower rates of 
welfare recidivism. 
By contrast, we find no evidence that 
temporary-help placements produce durable 
benefits for Work First clients or help them 
obtain direct-hire jobs. The initial earnings 
gains  observed  following  temporary-help 
agency placements are subsequently offset 
by lower earnings (the result of less frequent 
employment) and higher welfare recidivism 
over the next one to two years. Clients taking 
such jobs are no more likely to work for a 
direct-hire employer in the subsequent two 
years than clients who receive no placement 
at all. It thus appears that temporary-help 
placements displace other productive job-
search and work opportunities rather than 
foster new opportunities. 
The  results  do  not  imply  that 
temporary agency jobs never improve long-
term  outcomes  for  workers.  Rather,  they 
demonstrate that temporary-help placements 
induced by job-assistance programs do not 
on average help participants advance in the 
labor market. 
The  results  should  interest  policy-
makers. Public agencies play a substantial 
role in determining the types of jobs their 
clients  seek,  and  many  have  turned  to 
temporary agencies in hopes of hastening 
their clients’ successful entry into the labor 
market.  The  Detroit  results  suggest  that 
such strategies are not effective. 
What  are  the  reasons?  Detroit  Work 
First contractors interviewed for the research 
offered their thoughts. Several noted that 
some temporary agency jobs do provide a 
useful  entrée  into  direct-hire  placements 
with  good  employers.  But  temp-to-hire 
jobs  generally  require  stronger  skills  and 
more experience than their clients typically 
possess. Other contractors pointed out that 
some temporary agencies are willing to hire 
individuals with very weak skills, experience, 
and motivation if the jobs need few skills 
and  require  no  long-term  commitment. 
However, such jobs do not appear to confer 
benefits  beyond  what  clients  otherwise 
obtain on their own. 
In the long run, job placements that 
encourage  individuals  to  overcome  rather 
than  accommodate  their  limitations  may 
be  more  beneficial.  Thus,  an  important 
policy prescription of the research is that 
welfare programs should consider reducing 
the  incentives  for  contractors  to  move 
participants quickly into any job available 
and should instead motivate contractors to 
place clients in jobs offering greater stability 
and longer-lasting benefits. 
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